Human intuition and perception are basic and essential phenomena of consciousness. As such, they will never be replicated by computers. This is the challenging notion of Hubert Dreyfus, Ph. D., archcritic of the artificial intelligence establishment. It's important to emphasize that he doesn't believe that AI is fundamentally impossible, only that the current research program is fatally flawed. Instead, he argues that to get a device (or devices) with human-like intelligence would require them to have a human-like being in (...) the world, which would require them to have bodies more or less like ours, and social acculturation (i.e. a society) more or less like ours. This helps to explain the practical problems in implementing artificial intelligence algorithms. (shrink)

We assume that acting ethically is a skill. We then use a phenomenological description of five stages of skill acquisition to argue that an ethics based on principles corresponds to a beginner’s reliance on rules and so is developmentally inferior to an ethics based on expert response that claims that, after long experience, the ethical expert learns to respond appropriately to each unique situation. The skills model thus supports an ethics of situated involvement such as that of Aristotle, John Dewey, (...) and Carol Gilligan against the detached, rationalist ethics of Kant, John Rawls, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Jürgen Habermas. (shrink)

The following is a summary of the author’s five-stage model of adult skill acquisition, developed in collaboration with Hubert L. Dreyfus. An earlier version of this article appeared in chapter 1 of Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (1986, Free Press, New York).

The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus (...) & Dreyfus, 1988, pp. 30 – 31). This leads us to offer an account of the “perspectival deliberation” that arises for experts and masters and that is distinct from the calculative deliberation characteristic of the lower stages of skillfulness. (shrink)

The author proposes a neural-network-based explanation of how a brain might acquire intuitive expertise. The explanation is intended merely to be suggestive and lacks many complexities found in even lower animal brains. Yet significantly, even this simplified brain model is capable of explaining the acquisition of simple skills without developing articulable rules for behavior or a model of the skill domain or an explicit identification of which observables in the environment are necessary for skillful behavior. Furthermore, no memories of prior (...) experiences during the learning phase are explicitly stored and accessed during behavior. The explanation thus calls into doubt many conventional and intuitively reasonable assumptions concerning the learning and production of intuitive expertise. (shrink)

Influenced by recent neuroscientific research, the author proposes that the cognition underlying creativity should be seen as a sequential process requiring the appropriate interspersing of both intuitive and analytical modes of thought. Each of these modes may concern itself with either identifying the information that is the focus of potentially creative cognition or with the creative perspective from which to view the information. Here, perspective refers to the salience of various elements of the information set, of which some elements might (...) be seen as crucially important to a creative treatment of the situation, while other pieces of information may appear as merely contextually relevant. (shrink)

One's model of skill determines what one expects from neural network modelling and how one proposes to go about enhancing expertise. We view skill acquisition as a progression from acting on the basis of a rough theory of a domain in terms of facts and rules to being able to respond appropriately to the current situation on the basis of neuron connections changed by the results of responses to the relevant aspects of many past situations. Viewing skill acquisition in this (...) ways suggests how one can avoid the problem currently facing AI of how to train a network to make human-like generalizations. In training a network one must progress, as the human learner does, from rules and facts to wholistic responses. As to future work, from our perspective one should not try to enhance expertise as in traditional AI by attempting to construct improved theories of a domain, but rather by improving the learner's access to the relevant aspects of a domain so as to facilitate learning from experience. (shrink)

_Internet_ is een van de eerste boeken waarin het filosofische inzicht -van Plato tot Kierkegaard - betrokken wordt op het debat over de mogelijkheden en onmogelijkheden van het internet. Dreyfus laat zien dat de onstoffelijke, 'vrij zwevende' websurfer zijn oorsprong vindt in Descartes' scheiding van geest en lichaam, en hoe Kierkegaards inzichten in de opkomst van het moderne leespubliek vooruitlopen op de nieuwsgierige, maar elk risico vermijdende internet-junkie. Uitgaande van recente onderzoeken naar het isolement dat veel internetgebruikers ervaren, toont (...) Dreyfus aan hoe het internet, door zijn nadruk op privé-ervaringen, gebruikers berooft van wezenlijke, belichaamde vermogens zoals vertrouwen, stemmingen en betrokkenheid bij met anderen gedeelde lokale aangelegenheden. _Internet_ is verplichte kost voor iedereen die on line is en is geïnteressseerd in onze plaats in de 'e-revolutie'. (shrink)

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or (...) should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy. (shrink)

IN SEPTEMBER 1957, Herbert Simon, a pioneer in cognitive simulation, predicted that within ten years, i.e., by now, a computer would be world chess champion and would prove an important mathematical theorem. This prediction was based on Simon's early initial success in writing a program that could play legal chess and one able to prove simple theorems in logic and geometry. But the early successes turned out to be based on the solution of problems that were simple for machines, and (...) further progress turned out to be more and more difficult, until recently it has begun to be obvious to interested observers, and even to some workers in the field, that the original optimism of Simon and company was unfounded. (shrink)

Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: are we Essentially Rational Animals? Philosophers have long thought that what differentiates humans from mere animals is that humans are essentially rational. The rational nature of human beings lies in their ability to detach themselves from ongoing involvement and to ask for as well as give reasons for activity. According to the philosophical tradition, human action and perception generally should be understood in light of this ability. This essay examines a contemporary version of this conviction, one (...) promulgated by John McDowell. McDowell follows the tradition in suggesting that people are always able to step back and to ask as well as answer why questions about what they are doing, i.e., they always have reasons for their actions. This essay shows that people have no reasons for many of the things they do. They often, instead, simply respond to shifting situational fields of attraction and repulsion. These attractions and repulsions cannot be captured in propositional form—any attempt to describe, or even just name, them turns them into objects and robs them of their motivational force. The demands of the situation are not available as reasons, but exist only as embodied in actions. McDowell, consequently, errs in claiming that conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated in human activity. Nor is the detached, rational way of being any more essential to human life than is involved coping. (shrink)

L'action et la pensee de Dina Dreyfus (1911-1999), ne furent pas moins clandestines qu'importantes. Restee dans l'ombre de son premier mari, Claude Levi-Strauss, dont on ignore trop souvent qu'elle fut la co-organisatrice de la mission Claude et Dina Levi-Strauss sur les Indiens du Mato-Grosso, Dina Dreyfus fut pourtant une ethnologue de terrain, qui sut participer activement a la fondation et au rayonnement de la discipline. Pendant la guerre, ses actes de resistance dans les reseaux montpellierains, furent menes dans (...) la clandestinite alors qu'elle enseignait sous la fausse identite de Denise Roche. Enfin, elle concut son travail d'enseignant puis d'inspecteur general de philosophie comme une mission au service des eleves et des enseignants. Elle fut la premiere a comprendre l'utilite des differents medias dans l'enseignement. (shrink)

We appreciate the thoughtful responses we have received on ?Disclosing New Worlds?. We will respond to the concerns raised by grouping them under three general themes. First, a number of questions arise from lack of clarity about how the matters we undertook to discuss ? especially solidarity ? appear when one starts by thinking about the primacy of skills and practices. Under this heading we consider (a) whether we need more case studies to make our points, and (b) whether national (...) and other solidarities require willingness to die for the values that produce that solidarity. Second, we take up questions concerning the historical character of the skills of entrepreneurs, virtuous citizens, and culture figures. Here we shall (a) emphasize how we distinguish ourselves from earlier writers on these subjects, (b) consider essentialism, relational identities, and exclusion, (c) answer a number of Habermasian concerns raised by Hoy, (d) speak to Taylor's concern regarding the contingency of solidarity and forgetting, and (e) take up Grant's objection that we are both formalists and relativists. Third, we shall take up the concern, raised mostly by Borgmann, that historical disclosing, that is to say history as the West has known it, is over, and that now all that can be done by those who transform the practices is to make them more and more technological. (shrink)

Robust realism is defended by developing further the account in Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 49-78 of how human beings make things and people intelligible. Incommensurate worlds imply a violation of the principle of noncontradiction, but this violation does not have the consequences normally feared. Given our capacities to make things intelligible, some things, like human action, are most intelligible when they are understood as contradictory (e.g. free and determined). Things-in-themselves need not have contradictory features for multiple orders of nature to (...) make sense. We can coherently suppose that both Western and Chinese science give two incommensurable and complete accounts of the functioning of the human body. Since things do not have contradictory properties, we would then have to suppose that, in the case of bodies, there are two independent functional orders. If this can be true for bodies, it can be true for the orders of nature as a whole. John Haugeland's account of systems and interfaces shows us how to make sense of necessary functional components of the universe. Finally, multiple realism makes more sense than Rorty's deflationary pragmatism because it explains how things can matter. (shrink)

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

La notion de dispositif est déterminante dans I’analytique foucaldienne de la société. Et pourtant, son étude demeure négligée par la réception internationale. Après avoir discuté brièvement des difficultés rencontrées avec la traduction du terme de dispositif par Dreyfus et Rabinow dans Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, I’article développe une analytique sociale à partir de la pensée « dispositionelle » de Foucault. L’esquisse de I’histoire du terme de dispositif permettra, en outre, de mieux saisir la pertinence de son usage par Foucault.

Experts in medical informatics have argued for the incorporation of ever more machine-learning algorithms into medical care. As artificial intelligence research advances, such technologies raise the possibility of an “iDoctor,” a machine theoretically capable of replacing the judgment of primary care physicians. In this article, I draw on Martin Heidegger’s critique of technology to show how an algorithmic approach to medicine distorts the physician–patient relationship. Among other problems, AI cannot adapt guidelines according to the individual patient’s needs. In response to (...) the objection that AI could develop this capacity, I use Hubert Dreyfus’s analysis of AI to argue that attention to the needs of each patient requires the physician to attune his or her perception to the patient’s history and physical exam, an ability that seems uniquely human. Human physician judgment will remain better suited to the practice of primary care despite anticipated advances in AI technology. (shrink)

Experts in medical informatics have argued for the incorporation of ever more machine-learning algorithms into medical care. As artificial intelligence research advances, such technologies raise the possibility of an “iDoctor,” a machine theoretically capable of replacing the judgment of primary care physicians. In this article, I draw on Martin Heidegger’s critique of technology to show how an algorithmic approach to medicine distorts the physician–patient relationship. Among other problems, AI cannot adapt guidelines according to the individual patient’s needs. In response to (...) the objection that AI could develop this capacity, I use Hubert Dreyfus’s analysis of AI to argue that attention to the needs of each patient requires the physician to attune his or her perception to the patient’s history and physical exam, an ability that seems uniquely human. Human physician judgment will remain better suited to the practice of primary care despite anticipated advances in AI technology. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the question of educational time is absolutely essential in contemporary debates concerning the fate of the university. In order to examine the nature of educational time, this article first outlines Heidegger's distinction between temporality and Temporality. Second, the author makes a clarification between inauthentic and authentic learning as two forms of educational temporality. Here the article turns to the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus on expert skill building versus standardised (...) or generic forms of learning. When inauthentic and authentic forms of temporality are brought to light through this distinction, new ways of understanding the convergence and divergence of learning modes open up for critical reflection. Third, the article suggests that while differentiations internal to learning are critical in the struggle to define the nature of education, education cannot be reduced to its temporalising forms. At this point, the work of one of Heidegger's late students, Giorgio Agamben, becomes important for grounding the educational experience in Temporality through study. At stake here is carving out a time in education for enpresencing versus self-projection through action. And finally, the article turns back to Hediegger in order to see the ethical limitations of too quickly collapsing education into learning—even if that learning is authentic. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the question of educational time is absolutely essential in contemporary debates concerning the fate of the university. In order to examine the nature of educational time, this article first outlines Heidegger's distinction between temporality and Temporality. Second, the author makes a clarification between inauthentic and authentic learning as two forms of educational temporality. Here the article turns to the work of Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus on expert skill building versus standardised (...) or generic forms of learning. When inauthentic and authentic forms of temporality are brought to light through this distinction, new ways of understanding the convergence and divergence of learning modes open up for critical reflection. Third, the article suggests that while differentiations internal to learning are critical in the struggle to define the nature of education, education cannot be reduced to its temporalising forms. At this point, the work of one of Heidegger's late students, Giorgio Agamben, becomes important for grounding the educational experience in Temporality through study. At stake here is carving out a time in education for enpresencing versus self-projection through action. And finally, the article turns back to Hediegger in order to see the ethical limitations of too quickly collapsing education into learning—even if that learning is authentic. (shrink)

Fifteen essays by as many contributors with a summative introduction by Edie. The contributors are Dreyfus, Adamczewski, Earle, Compton, J. E. Smith, J. M. Anderson, Natanson, Silber, Crosson, Molina, G. E. Myers, Tillman, W. J. Richardson, Langan, and Findlay. All of the essays were presented in one form or another at one of the last three meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Some of them have been considerably reworked and expanded, the most important of which is (...) John Silber's fifty-seven page paper, "Being and Doing." Silber subjects the contemporary analytical version of voluntary responsibility, as found paradigmaticaliy in H. L. A. Hart's work, to a severe critique, arguing that a notion of status responsibility which involves following intentions and motives back to their pre-thematic roots in attitudes and a whole style of life, or way of being, is more consonant with human experience and nature than the antiseptic notion of responsibility developed by Hart. Even Hampshire takes his lumps at Silber's hands. Other excellent papers include Findlay's "Essential Probabilities," which can be read as a plea for a material logic, and Richardson's "Kant and the Late Heidegger," which uses Heidegger's reflection on the Kantian problematic to examine the issue of the continuity between the early and the later Heidegger. Not all of the essays approach the standards of these three, but for a collection of papers that have only the meeting of the same society in common, this is better than most.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance, habitual action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make (...) your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus– does not perform like an expert when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness. (shrink)

This paper defends the possibility that meaningful learning can be supported by the Internet. Responding to Hubert Dreyfus’s neo-Kierkegaardian contention that the Internet inhibits and does not support meaningful learning, we argue that it is a valuable tool for learning that can promote the development of intellectual expertise without the accompanying atrophy of personhood that Dreyfus believes is a prominent effect of extensive engagement with the Internet. Additionally, we argue that a conflation of practically ultimate commitments and epistemically (...) ultimate commitments underlies Dreyfus’s conception of unconditional commitments that constitutes the core of his critique of the possibility of meaningful learning on the Web. (shrink)

This essay primarily disputes Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: (1) that Searle’s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl’s; (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to (...) be unwarranted owing to a lack of fundamental parallelisms between Searle’s and Husserl’s theories of intentionality. I show the second to be mistaken for failing to take into account Heidegger’s strategic handling of the concept of consciousness and for contradicting Heidegger’s concept of care as the essential meaning of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Lastly, I show the third to be highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power. (shrink)

La sobrecarga de información resulta un problema epistemológico que preocupa a distintas áreas del conocimiento tales como al campo de las ciencias cognitivas, en su intento por modelar sistemas capaces de detectar relevancia como a la ya olvidada enciclopedística, practicada durante los siglos XVI- XVIII y abocada a la organización, disposición y difusión de la información científica de la época. El presente artículo intenta dar cuenta del fracaso de estos dos campos de investigación a la hora de hallar soluciones ante (...) la problemática de la sobrecarga informacional. Para abordar nuestra cuestión clave, examinaremos particularmente las miradas relativamente pesimistas de H. Dreyfus y de Novalis. Los tratamientos de estos autores demuestran que la sobrecarga de información no puede, ni podrá ser resuelta, si no se recurre a otra vía de investigación por fuera de aquellas que se muestran como insuficientes, a saber: el modelo computacional de la mente (Dreyfus) y la operación enciclopedística clasificatoria (Novalis). (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that embodied presence and ultimate commitments are not necessary for the authenticity of online relationships. In the first section, I will present Hubert Dreyfus’s Kierkegaardian analysis of the Internet. In the second, I will show the different positions that disagree with Dreyfus. And finally, in the third, I will look into the distinction between human to human and human to nonhuman online interactions, the continuity or discontinuity of the online and the offline (...) relationships of persons, and the forms of the relationship that occurred. From that analysis, I will derive some cases that will show the inadequacies and problems of the conditions presented by Dreyfus. (shrink)

For more than a quarter of a century, Hubert L. Dreyfus has been the leading voice in American philosophy for the continuing relevance of phenomenology, particularly as developed by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Dreyfus has influenced a generation of students and a wide range of colleagues, and these volumes are an excellent representation of the extent and depth of that influence.In keeping with Dreyfus's openness to others' ideas, many of the essays in this volume (...) take the form of arguments with various of his positions. The essays focus on the dialogue with the continental philosophical tradition, in particular the work of Heidegger, that has played a foundational role in Dreyfus's thinking. The sections are Philosophy and Authenticity; Modernity, Self, and the World; and Heideggerian Encounters. The book concludes with Dreyfus's responses to the essays.Contributors : William D. Blattner, Taylor Carman, David R. Cerbone, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Charles Guignon, Michel Haar, Beatrice Han, Alastair Hannay, John Haugeland, Randall Havas, Jeff Malpas, Mark Okrent, Richard Rorty, Julian Young, Michael E. Zimmerman. (shrink)

The journey of phenomenology apparently is not so extensive, because it was the first half of the twentieth century when Edmund Husserl appeared as the founder of phenomenology. But, it has its very roots in the works of ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This journey did not stopped here, as various phenomenologists have also been contributing in this field and establishing the linkage between phenomenology and symbolic interactionism as well as its very relation to research. Researchers in (...) the presented work have critically analyzed the contributions of prominent phenomenologists, i.e. from Hegel to Dreyfus and have applied relational analysis. The present study propounds that with the passage of time, the concept of phenomenology has been constructively evolving; in a sense that it has become more calculative. (shrink)

Bien qu’il ait été défini comme un ordre des successions, le temps leibnizien s’y réduit-il? Le recours à Deleuze permet d’en douter. D’une part, les mondes de verre de la fin de la Théodicée sont interprétés comme des cristaux, qui révèlent le temps dans son ensemble. Nous verrons pour Leibniz même, indépendamment de Deleuze, ce qui autorise une telle forme du temps. D’autre part, dès Logique du sens, Deleuze compte sur la topologie d’une courbe pour synthétiser les événements d’un monde. (...) La convergence de leurs points entraîne enfin que les mondes divergent en une bifurcation, dont nous demanderons si la Confessio philosophi ne l’autorisait pas déjà, dans sa conception de l’acte libre. (shrink)